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The Subjective Dimension of Anxiety:
A Neglected Area in Modem
Approaches to Anxiety?
Gerrit Glas
Academic Hospital Utrecht, Utrecht, and
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
INTRODUCTION
Subjective feelings are commonly considered as belonging to the core of emo-
tion. When asked to define a particular emotion, people in most cases refer to
mental states like feelings, sensations, sentiments, or inclinations. However, as
soon as these subjective feeling states are subjected to scientific scrutiny, they
seem to resist further examination. What appears to be crucial for the patient,
i.e., the subjective experience of emotion, seems to withdraw and even to dis-
solve as soon as one tries to adjust it to the frame of scientific method and
experimental design.
The study of emotion has to a large extent been concerned with physiology,
motor behavior, verbal expression, and cognition (1). These phenomena are,
indeed, strongly associated with affective experience, but they do not have
affective quality in themselves. Bodily symptoms and cognitions may contrib-
ute to the disturbing and compelling character of feelings and emotions, but they
are not as such disturbing and compelling.
This chapter on the subjective dimension of anxiety is written against the
background of this gap between the ordinary and the scientific understanding
of emotion. Anxiety is a major example of this gap. In the scientific literature
relatively little has been written about anxiety as a feeling state (see Refs. 2,3).
Even less attention has been paid to the varieties of the experience of anxiety.
43
44 Glas
Panic, fright, terror, dread, fear, worry, and apprehension—these terms give
only a weak impression of the immense diversity of the subjective experience
of anxiety. Clinicians, of course, are familiar with this diversity. Their job is
to unravel the meaning of the many images, metaphors, and nonverbal expres-
sions patients use in order to reveal what is going on in their minds. From a
scientific point of view these communications may be called idiosyncratic. But,
when listened to carefully in a clinical context, these idiosyncrasies often ap-
pear to be meaningful, for instance, when seen from a biographical perspec-
tive. The history of anxiety disorder is a learning history, with often highly
specific triggers and sustaining factors.
The study of the subjective dimension of anxiety is not only haunted by the
enormous diversity in the experience of anxiety. Another factor that contrib-
utes to the gap between the ordinary and the scientific understanding of anxi-
ety seems to be related to something in the feeling of anxiety itself, i.e., its
nontransparency. Freud alluded to this in one of his early writings (4), where
he noted that in anxiety neurosis the affect of anxiety "proves to be non-reduc-
ible in the psychological analysis." According to Freud, the fears of anxiety
neurosis differ from phobic anxieties in that they cannot be explained by the
mechanism of substitution. Phobic anxiety becomes transparent by referring to
repressed memories and representations. In the Freudian view, the phobic situ-
ation serves as a substitute for the object or situation that was initially feared.
In anxiety neurosis, however, the feeling of anxiety cannot be analyzed in this
way: it is unanalyzable in a psychological sense. Freud explains this by refer-
ring to biology: the anxiety of anxiety neurosis is the mental analogon of a
somatic quantity of (libidinal) energy, which is processed inadequately and
conducted to the wrong neural paths. This biological view indeed shows some
resemblance to some recent opinions about panic disorder.
In this chapter I will take the almost impenetrable and nonreducible feeling
of anxiety as a paradigm case. This case will serve as a guide in our exami-
nation of the subjective dimension of anxiety. First, I will give a brief summary
of the three main directions in the interpretation of anxiety. Then, I will com-
ment on a brief excerpt of a conversation with a patient with panic disorder with
agoraphobia. After this I will discuss some of the distinctions which are drawn
in descriptive psychopathology, anxiety in the context of psychosis, and the
research on the so-called ideational or cognitive component of fear and anxi-
ety.
MAIN DIRECTIONS IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF ANXIETY
From a historical point of view, three lines in the interpretation of pathologi-
cal anxiety may be discerned. First and foremost, there is medical tradition.
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which since antiquity has dominated the theoretical literature on anxiety and
which, at least during the last 150 years, has tended to favor a biological ap-
proach. According to this tradition anxiety is rooted in a dysbalance in a physi-
ological and/or neuroendocrine equilibrium. Subjective feelings are the epi-
phenomena of this dysbalance. From a medical viewpoint, their relevance is
limited. At best these feelings may provide a clue for the identification of a
particular, dysfunctioning biological subsystem.
Second, the concept of anxiety as an inner threat must be distinguished. Well
known as it is now, one can hardly imagine the revolutionary significance of
this concept as it emerged in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
psychoanalytic literature. Contemporary defenders of this view can be found
in psychotherapeutic circles and in some branches of cognitive psychology.
They do not deny that fear and anxiety may be related to some external dan-
ger. In addition, however, they maintain that in human anxiety it is often in-
ner threat that is of central importance. The patient is disturbed by the inner
danger of being out of control and vulnerable, physically or socially.
Finally, the existential concept of anxiety is worth mentioning, a concept
dating from the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Pascal and Kierkegaard,
respectively), which via existential phenomenology inspires the work of exis-
tential psychotherapists and anthropological psychiatrists in our age. Accord-
ing to this concept the feeling of anxiety must be seen as the mental expres-
sion of a frustrated urge for self-realization or as the expression of the imminent
annihilation of personal identity and psychic integrity.
These three traditions still seem to diverge. Contemporary psychiatry gives
the appearance that medical tradition is enlarging its domain at the expense of
the psychoanalytic and anthropological traditions. It should be noted, however,
that psychiatry as a medical discipline has incorporated elements of the second
tradition, for instance, the idea of anxiety as a signal of inner threat and some
of the contributions of cognitive psychology. This chapter attempts to show that
integration of some of the viewpoints of the anthropological tradition may be
of some relevance.
THE FEELING OF ANXIETY
Let us proceed with a fragment of an audiotaped interview (I) with a 35-year-
old, solitary-living, male patient (P) who had suffered from panic disorder with
agoraphobia for more than 15 years.
P: It is a kind of empty feeling. An emptiness . . . here (points with his finger
to his stomach)... an empty space in which something is scraping. Yet there is
nothing in there.
I: Is it a feeling in your stomach?
P: Yes . . . yes ... it is here (points again and smiles).
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I: You smile?
P: Yes, it is so weird. That such a thing embitters one's life! But it makes me
so sick... it is so strong . . . I cannot resist it.
I: What makes it so unpleasant to have that feeling?
P: "It is as if something is going to happen . . . something very serious and
threatening, I don't know what. It disturbs me. It is such a strong feeling, I can't
ignore it. . . .1 must give in. If I don't, it becomes even worse. It dominates me.
My mind loses control.
There are several remarkable points in what the patient says. Perhaps most
remarkable, however, is what the patient does not say, i.e., that he suffers from
massive fear and that he is frightened by his bodily sensations. The patient
clearly suffers from an anxiety disorder. But terms like fear, panic, terror, or
anxiety are not even mentioned. The patient seems to omit what is most obvi-
ous. What is this?
From a practical point of view, one might recall the well-established fact that
patients with panic disorder tend to attribute their distress to physical disease.
These patients populate the consulting rooms of general practitioners, cardiolo-
gists, gastroenterologists, endocrinologist, and gynecologists. They feel their
anxiety but do not mention it, or consider it as secondary to some physical
abnormality (5).
But again, why is this? Why do patients with anxiety disorders talk exhaus-
tively about all kinds of physical complaints when it is anxiety that is the ulti-
mate source of their suffering? The interview suggests that shame might be part
of the answer. The patient smiles; he seems embarrassed by the futility of his
complaints. He realizes that whatever he might say, it will always sound im-
plausible and bizarre: "That such a thing embitters one's life!" No matter how
eloquent he might be, his verbalizations will never be adequate in revealing
what is going on, that he has no choice, and that his abdominal sensations do
not give him the opportunity to regain his calm. And that, indeed, may be
shameful to admit.
But shame is only pan of the answer. The interview illustrates this. Soon
after the shameful moment of self-observation, the patient vehemently maintains
that he cannot resist his abdominal sensations. It is a very strong feeling; it
makes him feel sick. The vehemence of these assertions might be interpreted
as an attempt to master the shame. But is also suggests that there may be an-
other reason for the absence of words like anxiety and fear. The patient seems
to be caught in a paradoxical situation, i.e., a situation in which, on the one
hand, there is no reality other than these paralyzing sensations, and, on the other
hand, little more seems to be left than to admit that these sensations are point-
less. There is simply nothing to be explicit about or to be untangled. There are
just these devastating sensations—sensations without an object and without a
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cause, sensations that can hardly be communicated and that lock the patient in
his Cartesian private world.
Sometimes, this discussion is short-circuited by saying that fear and anxi-
ety, as emotions, are to be separated from bodily sensations. According to a
popular (Jamesian) view, emotions like fear and anxiety should be seen as
caused by bodily sensations. Others hold the opposite (Cannonian) view. They
consider bodily sensations as the peripheral consequences of an underlying
central state of anxiety (7). Whatever the evidence for either of those views,
both are built on common ground, i.e., a conceptual and/or experiential dis-
tinction between bodily sensation and emotion. This distinction, however,
should not blind us to the fact that bodily sensations may have emotional quality
themselves. The patient in the interview is not only frightened because of his
bodily sensations: his anxiety also consists of the specific, vital quality of these
sensations. Interpretations which are based on a strong distinction between
sensation and emotion tend to overlook that the experience of bodily sensation
itself often involves more than simply a "cold" perception that something is
happening in the body. The interview suggests that, in case of anxiety disor-
der, there is no such "cold" perception or distant self-observation.
What appears to be of central importance in the patient's experience of his
bodily sensation is the ineffectiveness of his attempt to regain control, the central
feeling of weakness and powerlessness, and, ultimately, the feeling of un-
connectedness and the ensuing awareness of being totally isolated. All of these
elements seem to be implied in—and not secondary to—the experience of bodily
sensation.
If this is true, the reason for the absence of terms like anxiety and fear can
be construed in another way. It could be maintained that
1. The feeling of anxiety, in this case, precisely consists of this ineffective-
ness, powerlessness, and sense of isolation.
2. The patient's difficulty in verbalizing what is going on should be taken
as one of the expressions of this core feeling of powerlessness and lack
of control.
3. Terms like fear and anxiety, when used in an ordinary sense, do not
entail these connotations, and, for that reason, often do not occur in the
vocabulary of the patient.
Of course, these statements are somewhat one-sided. Speech samples show that
in fact many anxiety disorder patients do use terms like fear, anxiety, and panic.
In many cases there is clearly something they are afraid of: losing control of
their thoughts or actions, having a heart attack, suffocation, rejection and/or
abandonment, future disaster, and—also—bodily sensations. But this should not
lead us to deny that there is an experience of anxiety that is still more elemen-
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tary than these fears. The reason why this experience is often not verbalized
in terms of anxiety could be that in ordinary language fear and anxiety are
usually associated with a danger that can be identified. In cases of pathologi-
cal anxiety, however, there is often no identifiable fear-provoking object, un-
like the experience of anxiety itself or one of its consequences (losing control,
suffocation, and so forth). This is why expressions like "fear of fear" and "fear
of anxiety" have been introduced into clinical and scientific language. The
experience of anxiety is often a double-layered one: behind the fear of a more
or less concrete danger one can find a vital, sensation-like experience, which
is much more difficult to put into words because it seems to lack a definable
object. It is often this anxiety that is the object of the patient's fears. Compare,
for instance, the account of an anonymous surgeon (2):
It is as difficult to describe to others what an acute anxiety state feels like as to
convey to the inexperienced the feeling of falling in love. Perhaps the most char-
acteristic impression is the constant state of causeless and apparently meaningless
alarm. You feel as if you were on the battlefield or had stumbled against a wild
animal in the dark, and all the time you are conversing with your fellows in
normal peaceful surroundings and performing duties you have done for years.
With this your head feels vague and immense and sniffed with cottonwool; it is
difficult, and trying, to concentrate; and, most frightening of all, the quality of
your sensory appreciation of the universe undergoes an essential change.
What has been said here so eloquently in many cases will remain implicit in
the experience of anxiety itself. Anxiety is not primarily the consciousness of
being out of control and unconnected. It is, rather, the way in which the pow-
erlessness and unconnectedness are embodied and lived.
To anticipate what will be said below, anxiety is first of all a vital and el-
ementary experience. Its definition should not be reduced to the enumeration
of its cognitive contents. Expectations, evaluations, images, and representations
may be part of the experience of anxiety. But anxiety cannot be equated with
these products of consciousness, for many people have these anxiety-provok-
ing expectations, evaluations, images, and representations without becoming
anxious.
DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY:
OBJECT-BOUND FEAR AND OBJECTLESS ANXIETY
To be sure, what has been said until now comes very close to an old and well-
known distinction in descriptive psychopathology, i.e., the one between object-
bound fear and objectless anxiety. It is interesting to see how this distinction
has been dealt with in the various traditions in the interpretation of anxiety.
Neurobiologically minded investigators tend to a view in which objectless
anxiety is seen as the subjective correlate of an archaic and purely organic state,
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whereas object-bound fear is regarded as a product of the activity of brain areas
mediating higher cognitive processes. Gorman et al. (8), for instance, suggest
that the distinctions in the experience of anxiety correlate with different degrees
of cognitive complexity. Cognitive complexity in its turn is related to neuroana-
tomical location. Referring to MacLean's concept of a tripartite organization of
the brain, they hypothesize that panic is mediated by the brain stem, free-float-
ing anxiety by limbic activity, and anticipatory anxiety by frontal processes.
Psychoanalytic investigators tend to a similar threefold distinction, by dis-
cerning between traumatic or "automatic" anxiety, corresponding to a state of
biological helplessness at birth, free-floating or signal anxiety, which serves as
a warning signal of this traumatic anxiety, and anticipatory anxiety, which is
associated with a particular object representing a real or imaginary threat. In-
terestingly, however, this division is not interpreted as merely a reflection of
differences in cognitive complexity, but as a challenge to uncover what is
nontransparent and objectless at first sight. It is true that Freud never completely
abandoned the idea of a purely organically based form of anxiety (as the basis
of actual or anxiety neurosis). But in later versions of his theory of neurosis,
Freud developed the notion of anxiety as a warning signal. Objectless, or free-
floating, anxiety is then viewed as a signal, which is produced by the ego and
which serves as a warning of an unconscious conflict. The cognitive impen-
etrable nature of this anxiety, rather than being a reflection of a more primi-
tive neuronal state, serves as an incentive to lay bare those unconscious inner
conflicts which are supposed to generate this anxiety.
Behaviorally oriented scientists traditionally have not been as interested in
the phenomenal qualities of the experience of anxiety as they were in its ante-
cedents and behavioral consequences. It is only since the advent of cognitive
science that this picture has altered. We will discuss some of the results of the
new research later.
Finally, mention should be made of the continental, anthropological tradi-
tion. Building on the work of the philosopher Sören Kierkegaard (9), psycho-
pathologists like Jaspers (10), Kronfeld (l 1), Goldstein (12), and Störring (13)
held the view that behind all kinds of fear associated with concrete objects like
height, blood, crowds, small rooms, etc., there is a more fundamental anxiety,
which lacks such a definable object and does not even need to be conscious.
Goldstein, for instance, exposed World War I victims with organic brain dam-
age to complex cognitive tasks. He observed that his patients displayed overly
controlling and catastrophic reactions. In spite of their massive physiological
and psychomotor symptoms, the patients were often unaware of their anxiety.
Because the symptoms coincided with failure in the performance of cognitive
tasks. Goldstein interpreted both this failure and the other symptoms as imme-
diate manifestations of anxiety. According to this view, anxiety itself is a kind
of failure, rather than a secondary reaction to failure. The failure of Goldstein's
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patients resembles the insufficiency and powerlessness of the patient in the
interview. This insufficiency and powerlessness represents a tendency which is
opposed to the urge of self-preservation. This means, ultimately, that anxiety
transcends the domain of emotions. Anthropological psychiatrists consider anxi-
ety to be the expression of a fundamental and universal disintegrating tendency
in human life.
DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY:
OTHER DISTINCTIONS
We will now explore some other distinctions drawn with respect to the subjec-
tive experience of anxiety. Let us begin with the well-known distinction between
phobic fear, obsessive-compulsive fear, and panic.
Phobic anxiety consists of an unreasonable and inappropriate fear, which is
associated with situations of a particular type and often leads to the avoidance
of that situation. The family of phobias is usually divided into three groups:
agoraphobia, social phobia, and specific phobias. Specific phobias in their turn
are subdivided into phobias related to animals, physical harm (blood, injections,
bodily injury), natural environment (heights, storms, water), and other specific
situations (airplanes, elevators, closed spaces, and situations that may lead to
contracting an illness).
The term agoraphobia is somewhat unfortunate because of its association with
fear of streets. Westphal (14), however, to whom we owe the term agorapho-
bia in its technical sense, already recognized that his patients were not afraid
of streets and squares as such. Theirs was rather a fear of anxiety itself, an
anxiety that may only later be linked to situations of a particular type. DSM-
IV spécifies these situations as "places or situations from which escape might
be difficult (or embarrassing) or in which help may not be available in the event
of having a panic attack or panic-like symptoms" (15). The "panic-like symp-
toms" in this definition refer to any of the 13 symptoms listed for panic attacks
or to other symptoms that may be incapacitating or embarrassing (e.g., loss of
bladder control). These definitions not only illustrate DSM-IV's emphasis on
the close relationship between panic and agoraphobia, but also the irrelevance
of distinguishing between internal and external stimuli. According to some older
views, phobias are characterized by fear of external stimuli. However, recent
research has suggested that fear of interoceptive sensations may be a central
element in many cases of panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (16,17).
The concept of disease phobia is too narrow to encompass all these cases.
Agoraphobics do not avoid their bodily symptoms, but the panic and helpless-
ness that ensue from being exposed to these symptoms. In the same vein, hypo-
chondriasis and panic disorder can be differentiated on the basis of the nature
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of the fear and the behaviors that accompany this fear. Hypochondriasis is
exclusively related to the fear of having (or the idea that one has) a serious
disease. This fear may have an obsessional quality and often leads to medical
"shopping." Hypochondriacs often show a "frustrating combination of demand-
ing neediness and help rejecting refractoriness to treatment"(18).
Social phobia is characterized by DSM-IV as a "marked and persistent fear
of one or more social or performance situations in which the person is exposed
to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by other others. The individual fears
that he or she will act in a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that will be hu-
miliating or embarrassing" (15). Social phobies and agoraphobics both fear their
symptoms of anxiety. The differentiation between the two conditions is not
based on the nature of these symptoms, but primarily on the patient's assess-
ment of the nature and the reason of the fear: possible scrutiny and/or humilia-
tion in social phobia versus no escape/no help in agoraphobia. It must be noted,
however, that this distinction sometimes does not suffice (19). There are, for
instance, patients who feel both humiliated by and helpless when confronted
with their symptoms. DSM-IV rightly adds that in these cases the role of the
companion may be useful in differentiating between social phobia and agora-
phobia. Agoraphobics typically prefer to be companied by a person who is
trusted, whereas social phobies feel scrutinized irrespective of whether they have
a companion or not. It has also been suggested that a distinction between pri-
mary and secondary social phobia might be useful here (20,21). Secondary
social phobia would occur in the setting of panic disorder and refer to fear of
embarrassment or humiliation were the patient to have a panic attack in front
of others. Primary social phobia would be related to immediate social concerns
and not to the embarrassment that secondarily results from the exhibit of symp-
toms of panic. As indicated above, DSM-IV has not gone so far by including
anxiety symptoms as a potential object of social phobic fear.
Obsessions are "persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images that are
experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or
distress" (15). Compulsions are "repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing,
ordering, checking) or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting, repeating words
silently) the goal of which is to prevent or reduce anxiety or distress" (15).
They attempt "to ignore or suppress [their] thoughts or impulses or to neutralize
them with some other thought or action" (15). In short, phobies avoid and
obsessives try to undo. Semantic clarity, however, does not preclude some
overlap between phobic and obsessive fears. Avoidance and undoing may come
very close to each other. Fear of dirt or contamination with feces or sperm may
provoke, for instance, both excessive washing rituals and avoidance of situa-
tions in which contamination cannot be undone (e.g., sexual intercourse, rooms
in one's home which cannot be cleaned because of lack of time). There are
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situations in which there is simply too much to undo. Aggressive obsessions
may lead to phobic avoidance of knives. Phobic fear, on the other hand, may
have an obsessional quality, a quality denoted by the old German term for
phobic kat—Zwangsbeßirchtung ("obsessional fear").
Panic is described by DSM-IV as "a discrete period in which there is the
sudden onset of intense apprehension, fearfulness, or terror, often associated
with feelings of impending doom. During the attacks, symptoms such as short-
ness of breath, palpitations, chest pain or discomfort, choking or smothering
sensations, and fear of 'going crazy' or losing control are present" (15). DSM-
IV lists 13 of these bodily and cognitive symptoms, 4 of which are needed to
meet the criteria for panic disorder. Limited-symptom attacks meet all other
criteria but have fewer than four symptoms.
There has been a lot of discussion about the presence or absence of situ-
ational triggers in panic disorder. Pan of this discussion was generated by the
results of naturalistic "monitoring" and "experience sampling" studies (22-24).
Margraf and colleagues (24), for instance, comment that panic patients some-
times fail to perceive environmental triggers. Many attacks that were classified
as spontaneous occurred in classical "phobic" situations. Patients also endorsed
a greater number of symptoms retrospectively than in their diary.
DSM-IV uses a threefold distinction, originally defended by Klein et al. (25;
see also Ref. 26), between unexpected (or uncued), situationally bound (or
cued), and situationally predisposed attacks. Unexpected attacks occur sponta-
neously "out of the blue." Situationally bound attacks occur "immediately on
exposure to, or in anticipation of, the situational trigger or cue." Situationally
predisposed attacks are "more likely to occur on exposure to the situational
trigger or cue and do not necessarily occur immediately after the exposure"
(15). The reason for this distinction is that the strong criterion of unexpected-
ness (DSM-III) did not appear to be appropriate for many attacks in case of
panic disorder. Situational cues and the anticipation of these cues may predis-
pose to panic attacks without immediately provoking them. This is why sit-
uationally predisposed attacks were admitted to support the diagnosis of panic
disorder. Situationally bound attacks typically occur in cases of social phobia
and specific phobia.
DSM-IV states that there should have been at least two unexpected attacks
and that at least one of those attacks should have been followed by (1) "per-
sistent concern about having additional attacks," (2) "worry about the impli-
cations of the attack or its consequences (e.g., losing control, having a heart
attack, 'going crazy')," and/or (3) "a significant change in behavior related to
the attacks" (15). In spite of these refinements in the defintion of panic disor-
der, there will always be borderline cases in which it is difficult to differenti-
ate between panic disorder, on the one hand, and social phobia, specific pho-
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bia, somatization disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, on the other hand
(27). The patient may, for instance, have had a number of unexpected attacks
in the distant past, but does not at present show any "persistent concern" or
"worry," whereas the "significant change in behavior" is gradually diminished
and changed into a phobic avoidance of a specific situation (e.g., tunnels). Other
patients have a lot of symptoms, without reporting any subjective fear. Still
others are clearly social phobic but suffer also from rare, uncued attacks. DSM-
IV mentions four factors that can be helpful in these cases: the focus of fear,
the type and number of panic attacks, the number of situations avoided, and
the level of intercurrent anxiety (15). The more limited the focus of the fear,
the lower the number of situations and the number of panic attacks, and the
lower the level of intercurrent anxiety, the less probable it is that a diagnosis
of panic disorder is warranted. In panic disorder, fear is primarily focused on
the occurrence of panic attacks.
The current emphasis on descriptive accuracy does not rule out the possi-
bility that there are anxiety-related subjective phenomena, which were lost in
the recent debates on classification. Depersonalization and derealization, for
instance, have almost disappeared as anxiety-related phenomena (except as
symptoms of panic disorder), in sharp contrast to the prominent role they played
in famous descriptions of men like Roth and Janet. The phobic anxiety-de-
personalization syndrome, which was described by Roth in 1959, was a trau-
matically induced combination of phobic, pseudo-hallucinatory and paniclike
symptoms, which today probably would be subsumed under the heading of both
posttraumatic stress disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia (28). De-
personalization was a salient feature of this syndrome.
In Janet's descriptions of the psychasthenic state, which, unfortunately, are
almost forgotten today, feelings of unreality and depersonalization also play a
major role. Common to all psychasthenic patients, says Janet, is a disturbance
in psychological functioning, the so-called psychasthenic state. This state is
characterized by what he calls a "sense of incompleteness" (sentiment d'in-
complétude), a diminishing of "the sense (or function) of reality" (la fonction
du réel), and exhaustion (29). The sense of incompleteness refers to a perva-
sive feeling of ineffectiveness. Whatever one does, it seems useless and not to
come to an end. Doubt, hesitance, rumination, depersonalization, feelings of
doubleness and unreality, restlessness, and apathy belong to the many manifes-
tations of this state. With regard to the diminishing of "the sense (or function)
of reality," Janet refers to a kind of mental presence that enables one to be alert,
spontaneous, and effective. The diminishing of this so-called coefficient of
reality is particularly important in the domains of voluntary action, attention,
and perception (29). According to Janet, psychasthenic patients show subtle
imperfections in concentration and in other "synthetic" mental functions. As a
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consequence of this "lowering of psychic tension" (abaissement du niveau
mental), routine daily activities may be disrupted.
From here, it is only a small step to the changes in the quality of the sen-
sory appreciation of the world. Think, for instance, of the typical changes in
the perception of space in agoraphobia. Landis (2) cites the following passage
from W. E. Leonard's autobiographical book The Locomotive-God, which deals
with the author's lifelong agoraphobia:
Home again becomes immeasurable distance, only more immeasurable And the
distance of three blocks to the railway-bridge girders is, I feel, an infinity of street
in the sun. I totter. I fly. I open my shirt to get air on my bare chest. There is a
white hitching-post by the gutter near the end of the block. My imagination cre-
ates this as its goal, as its refuge.
Open spaces like streets and squares may generate a feeling of infinite dis-
tance. Objects like railway-bridge girders and hitching-posts function as safety
signals. The world of the patient with agoraphobia is full of these warning and
safety signals. Some agoraphobics prefer darkness when leaving home. Others
use sunglasses in order not to see the "blockages" which could keep them from
the safety of home. Some of them describe the world outside as uncanny and
alienating, as a paralyzing vacuum destroying all initiative and self-confidence.
This is in contrast to the world of obsessive-compulsive patients, which is full
of objects and situations that could run out of control. Obsessive-compulsives
feel almost continuously at the edge of chaos. They are possessed by "demons,"
which are at the point of overwhelming them—the demons of dirt, sperm, fe-
ces, bad odors, physical harm, or microorganisms. Their rituals may result in
an alteration of time-perception. The endless repetition of thoughts and acts
leads to an altered or decreased sense of temporal change (30). Their world is
transformed into an imaginary world, in which temporal continuity is frag-
mented by the repetition of fixed behavioral sequences and thoughts that gradu-
ally take the place of real-world sorrows and occupations.
ANXIETY AND PSYCHOSIS
One of the most neglected topics in descriptive psychopathology is the subject
of psychotic anxiety (31). Of course, the frequent occurrence of anxiety in the
context of psychosis has not gone unnoticed. It was, for instance, Wernicke who
already at the end of the nineteenth century coined the term anxiety psychosis
to denote a psychopathological entity characterized by such intense anxiety that
frightening hallucinations, delusions, and delusory ideas were the result (32).
Many clinicians, then and now, consider anxiety as a consequence of all kinds
of cognitive disturbances. Wernicke challenges this view by arguing for the
primacy of anxiety. The ensuing debates not only centered around this theme,
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but also around the nature of psychomotor agitation. According to some clini-
cians psychomotor agitation was to be considered as a prominent symptom of
anxiety psychosis; others saw it as a secondary phenomenon or as part of agi-
tated melancholia or manic-depressive illness (33-35).
With the virtual disappearance of the term anxiety psychosis from clinical
usage, interest in anxiety symptoms in the context of psychosis also faded.
However, two important, unfortunately almost forgotten, publications are wor-
thy of mention: Störring's 2ur Psychopathologie und Klinik der Angstzustände
(On the Psychopathology and Treatment of Anxiety States) (13) and Conrad's
Die Beginnende Schizophrenie (Incipient Schizophrenia) (36). Both works
emphasize the fundamental significance of anxiety in the origin of psychosis.
Both go on to describe a period of depersonalization, anxiety, and anxious
mood, which often precedes the onset of psychosis. Conrad uses the term
"trema" to denote this anxious delusory mood. Störring describes how this
anxious delusory mood can lead to so-called objectivation of anxiety (nowadays
called projection). Feelings of anxiety are no longer experienced internally, but
transformed into perceptions of a dreadful and mysteriously changed world.
Feelings lose their natural bond with the I. As a consequence, they take on an
enigmatic and indeterminate character. While the patient does not necessarily
experience anxiety subjectively, the world nevertheless changes in an obscure
way and appears to be terrifying, threatening, and gruesome.
THE COGNITIVE COMPONENT
It is interesting to note that the surge of interest in the cognitive component of
anxiety initially resulted from a fascination with the nontransparency of the
feeling of anxiety, one of the main themes of this chapter. Beck et al. (37)
considers it an unfortunate tautology that anxiety neurosis is defined as a dis-
turbance in which the source of anxiety is unknown. "Since, by definition the
patient is unaware of the source of his anxiety, the clinical investigator is un-
likely to make a thorough examination of the content of the patient's phenom-
enal field." Building on observations collected during psychodynamic psycho-
therapy, they hypothesize that there are idiosyncratic thoughts, images, and
thinking patterns specific to each neurotic disorder. The thoughts and images
may last only a short time. In the case of "anxiety neurosis" this idiosyncratic
ideation mainly concerns the anticipation of physical harm (becoming sick,
being attacked or involved in an accident) or psychosocial trauma (humiliation,
rejection). Beck and coworkers (37) indeed found that 90% of their 24 patients
had vivid visualizations centering around the theme of danger prior to their
anxiety attack. All patients had danger-related cognitions. The investigators were
struck by the unique, personal content of the fear in each patient: "These per-
Glas
sonal variations often shed the most light on the relation between the patient's
mode of integrating his experiences and the arousal of anxiety" (37). Beck and
coworkers later formulated the notion of "personal domain," representing the
area of a person's vital interests (38,39). The study of Hibbert (40) yielded
broadly similar findings, although the fears of patients without panic attacks
were less readily classified as "personal dangers."
The same picture emerges from the study of Argyle (41), in which DSM-III
criteria were used. He found a difference in the focus of fear between sudden
and gradual-onset anxiety attacks, irrespective of whether the attacks occurred
in the context of panic disorder or another anxiety or (even) affective disorder.
Sudden attacks were associated with cognitions referring to immediate catas-
trophe, such as dying, fainting, collapsing, and going crazy. Cognitions of
gradual-onset anxiety were related to everyday worries, traveling, being alone,
other illnesses, and social embarrassment. Most of these cognitions concerned
future events. During sudden attacks, the range of cognitions was narrowed and
attention appeared to be directed inward to the mental or physical catastrophe
that was in the process of occurring. These results, however, do not allow one
to draw unequivocal conclusions about the relationship between the type of
cognition or sensation and the type of anxiety disorder. Investigations focus-
ing on this relation have provided only meager results. Hoehn-Saric (42), An-
derson et al. (43), Barlow et al. (44,45), Cameron et al. (46), and Borden and
Turner (47) indeed found slight differences in the symptom profiles of panic
disorder patients with or without agoraphobia, generalized anxiety disorder, and
a number of phobias. But these differences turned out to be insufficient to
establish a diagnosis of anxiety disorder. Overall intensity of the symptoms also
did not appear to be of diagnostic relevance. Finally, nonfearful panic disor-
der was discerned as a subgroup of panic disorder, suggesting that cognitions
are irrelevant for a subgroup of panic disorder patients (48). The most consis-
tent finding in all these studies is the presence of cardiovascular and respira-
tory symptoms in panic disorder (see Ref. 49).
As a consequence, the focus of cognitive research has shifted from corre-
lations between descriptive entities, such as those mentioned, to explanatory
constructs like anxious apprehension (50,51), fear of bodily sensations (16,52),
and fear of fear (53,54). Fear of fear in its turn has been divided into anxiety
sensitivity (55-57) and expectancy (or predictability) (58-63). Chambless and
Gracely (17) mention fear of bodily sensations as a component of fear of fear.
Uncontrollability has been suggested to represent an important dimension of
posttraumatic stress disorder (64).
Recent research suggests that there are least three fundamental fears: anxi-
ety sensitivity, fear of negative evaluation, and injury/illness sensitivity (63).
These fundamental fears appear to be factorially distinct and account for 22-
41 % of the variance of common forms of fear and trait anxiety (65). Taylor
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(65) suggests that the unexplained variance is mainly due to idiosyncratic fac-
tors in fear acquisition (e.g., aversive and traumatic experiences).
Finally, worry has been investigated as a central phenomenon in generalized
anxiety disorder. Results of these investigations suggest that worry primarily
involves thought, rather than imaginary, activity (66). Generalized anxiety dis-
order patients do seem to fail in terminating their worries (67). It has been
suggested that worry and (obsessive) checking are functionally similar (68).
CLOSING REMARKS
From this overview, one can only conclude that there is an enormous diver-
sity in the phenomenology and subjective experience of anxiety. We have seen
that this diversity to a large extent can be explained by idiosyncratic factors in
fear acquisition. This might imply that our expectations about future research
on the categorical and/or factorial separateness of different types of anxiety
should remain modest. However, the problem of diversity—and of comor-
bidity—may also be a reflection of shortcomings in our methodologies and in
the theoretical constructs on which these methodologies are based.
The term anxiety is typically a lay construct. Science transforms this con-
struct into one of the "components" of anxiety: verbal report. This transfor-
mation of subjective experience into verbal report, however, easily results in
isolation and decontextualization of the feeling aspect of anxiety (69):
If a client reports that [he or she has] acute attacks of somatic distress and a feeling
of doom, this is not regarded as the verbal/subjective component of a panic dis-
order but an item of behavior that should be interpreted structurally (in relation
to the presence or absence of other behaviours in the repertoire), contextual!) (as
an act whose meaning derives from a specific context) and functionally (in rela-
tion to eliciting and maintaining events).
The subjective meaning of a particular feeling state should in other words be
primarily derived from behavior patterns and the contexts in which these be-
havior patterns develop (see also Ref. 70). Classification of verbal report may
be too limited an approach to serve as an entry to the scientific understanding
of the subjective dimension of anxiety.
This is not meant to detract from the merits of verbal report in the clinical
situation. Here, however, the hazards of isolation and decontextualization can
be neutralized, particularly by the carefully conducted clinical interview and by
focusing on the biographical embeddedness of the patient's complaints. As was
mentioned in the introduction, pathological forms of anxiety must be seen as
products of a learning history.
It is interesting to note how the earlier descriptions, which were often heavily
loaded with psychodynamic terminology (see Ref. 71), have made room for
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descriptive precision, such as required by authoritative classification systems like
DSM and ICD. This is not to say that these classification systems, in particu-
lar the successive editions of the DSM, are totally nontheoretical. A category
like panic disorder cannot even be thought of without the numerous pharma-
cological and challenging studies that laid the basis for its existence as a sepa-
rate diagnostic entity. Ultimately, phenomenological description and theoreti-
cal explanation cannot be kept apart.
If all this is taken into consideration, one can only conclude that we are in
need of a conceptual framework in which different approaches to the phenom-
enon of anxiety are ordered systematically according to their viewpoint (mo-
lecular, physiological, behavioral, cognitive, social, and subjective) and their
level of abstraction (from pure description to approaches with a high level of
abstraction). With such a conceptual framework it would be possible to diminish
the gap between mere description of subjective mental states on the one hand
and explanation by high-level theoretical constructs on the other hand.
Throughout this chapter we have been concerned with the nontransparency
of the feeling of anxiety. Many authors challenged the view that this
nontransparency must be attributed solely to biological causation. Psychoana-
lysts and cognitive therapists pointed out that meaningless and objectless anxi-
ety may become meaningful and transparent in the course of psychotherapy.
Anthropological psychiatrists went a step further by stating that anxiety, rather
than being exclusively related to internal or external danger, must be conceived
as the counterpart of the human urge for self-realization. Anxiety, ultimately,
refers to a domain that is beyond that of emotion. This insight should not be
played off against other approaches, in particular the biological approach. For
the frustration of the urge for self-realization is expressed in all domains of
human functioning, the biological domain included.
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